

## Technical Annex

### *The Price of Democracy* *How Money Shapes Politics and What to Do about It*

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<http://www.thepriceofdemocracy.com>

This Technical Annex presents in detail the various data sources used to construct the figures in the book. The title of these figures is shown in bold in the text, with the associated page number. The reader will find a large number of these data online, on the website [thepriceofdemocracy.com](http://www.thepriceofdemocracy.com).

The Annex also includes a number of additional figures referred to in the book.

Finally, at the end of this Annex I propose a short indicative – and not exhaustive! – bibliography that will allow interested readers to better navigate the maze of works that focus, sometimes comparatively and often on a national basis, on the question of public and private funding of democracy and the regulations that govern it.

This Annex is not written with linear reading in mind: instead, I would advise readers to gather whatever information they might need as citizens, students, or researchers, according to their own reading and interest.

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I should like to make a clarification concerning all the figures presented in the book: I chose to present all the monetary values in **constant 2016 euros**. This choice stems from a desire to encourage comparisons between countries and to correct for inflation. Studying the evolution of campaign expenses over several decades in current euros would obviously make no sense! In addition to this, in order for the historical and international comparisons to be easier to interpret, I have usually chosen to standardize the numbers (whether they relate to party

spending or the public funding parties receive) by the adult population of the various countries in question.

I could also – particularly for comparisons over a very long period – have systematically standardized the amounts by the average national income per adult (as I did in the case of the United Kingdom for candidates' election expenses), because that has also increased in recent decades (even after inflation is taken into account). I chose not to do so here so that the main statistics presented would be easier to interpret. It should also be noted that the increase in real average national income (after taking inflation into account) has been relatively limited in rich countries since the 1980s (generally less than 1% per year), in contrast with the strong growth seen from the 1950s to the 1980s, so that standardization by the average national income plays a less important role for recent decades than for the previous ones. Interested readers will find complete series on the average national income of the various countries on the website [wid.world](http://wid.world).

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## Voter turnout

The data for voter turnout in legislative elections since 1945 (**Figure 1**, p.5) come from several sources.

For **France**, the data come from the [Centre de Données Socio Politiques](#) (CDSP) at Sciences Po, from the Interior Ministry's website and from [data.gouv.fr](http://data.gouv.fr).

For the **United States**, the data come from the United States Elections Project, which covers the period 1789-2014: <http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present>. For 2016, the data are available here: <http://www.electproject.org/2016g>.

For the **United Kingdom**, the voter turnout data come from my research paper co-authored by Edgard Dewitte ([Julia Cagé and Edgard Dewitte, 2018: "It Takes Money to Make MPs: New Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending"](#)). The data in this paper came from reports on candidates' election expenses published by the House of Commons ("*Election expenses – Return of the expenses of each candidate at the general election*"). These data exist in paper format from the year 1857 and are available digitally from 2001 on the Electoral Commission website.

For all of these countries, I decided to measure voter turnout by the number of votes cast (as a percentage of registered voters) rather than by the number of voters (even though the abstention rate is usually calculated in France as the number of voters divided by the number of registered voters, i.e. the blank and null ballots are not counted as abstentions).

I made that choice not only because it facilitates international comparisons, but also above all because I believe that blank votes should be taken into account in the future. This could go hand in hand with mandatory voting, but that's another debate!

## Election spending totals: data sources and additional figures

Different elections take place each year in the various countries analysed, on different dates and under changing rules. Thus, in an international comparison, it makes no sense to calculate the amount of election expenses on an annual basis. That is why in the book I made the choice to focus mainly on the legislative elections in order for the amounts to be comparable in time and between countries. However, in the case of France, I also collected data on all other elections; for the United States, my analysis covers both legislative elections and presidential elections.

Another important difference between countries is that while in a number of democracies – for example France or the United Kingdom – election expenses are mainly borne by the candidates (although a number of them receive financial support from their party), and it is therefore the candidates who present the electoral commission with a detailed report of their expenditure where it is limited and/or controlled, in other countries – for example Germany on account of proportional voting – it is the political parties that incur most of the election expenses.

### Germany

In Germany, there are no regulations limiting the expenses of candidates or political parties during election campaigns. Election expenses are managed largely at the level of political parties. For this reason, in the book I present the campaign expenditure of the various political parties. These data come from party accounts that I digitized and formatted from pdf files readily available online on the Bundestag website.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to the expenses of the candidates themselves in the electoral constituencies – which are certainly small but not non-existent – unfortunately I have not found any sources enabling me to construct the data series in a systematic and comparable way over time.

### United States

In the United States, the election expenditure data of candidates and political parties are freely available online in digital form on the election commission website (*Federal Election Commission*: <https://www.fec.gov/>).

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<sup>1</sup>For example, here: <https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/praesidium/parteienfinanzierung/rechenschaftsberichte>.



## France

For France, election spending data come from the campaign account data – “Publication simplifiée des comptes de campagne” – published by the [Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques](#) (CNCCFP) after each election since the early 1990s. The data is published in the “Journal officiel de la République française – Edition des documents administratifs”. I digitized and formatted these data in my research paper co-authored by Yasmine Bekkouche: “[The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014](#)”, [CEPR Discussion Paper #12614, 2018](#).

In addition, the total election expenditure of political parties can be found in the party accounts available online in pdf format on the website [CNCCFP](#) from 1990 to 2007 and in Excel format since 2008.

## United Kingdom

Legislative elections in the United Kingdom are known as “General Elections”.

With regard to election turnout data, the information on candidate spending comes from my research paper co-authored by Edgard Dewitte: “[It Takes Money to Make MPs: New Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending](#)”, [Working Paper, 2018](#). We gathered this information from the reports on candidates’ election expenses published by the House of Commons (“*Election expenses – Return of the expenses of each candidate at the general election*”). These data exist in paper format from the year 1857 and are available digitally from the 2001 election onwards on the Electoral Commission website.

For recent years, the interested reader will find information on candidates’ expenses here:

<https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/candidate-spending-and-donations-at-elections>

Since the early 2000s, data on political party spending in the UK can also be found on the Electoral Commission website:

<https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/political-party-spending-at-elections>

## Additional figures

Figure 1 presents the evolution of overall spending per candidate, and Figure 2 shows the evolution of average spending per candidate and of the number of candidates per election (note 5, p.24 of the book).





Figure 1 : Total candidate expenditure, United Kingdom, legislative elections, 1868-2015



**Figure 2:** Average expenditure by candidate and number of candidates, United Kingdom, legislative elections, 1868-2015

## From campaign meetings to social media: the nature of election spending

In Chapter 8, I explain the various types of election spending by parties and candidates (particularly in the section entitled “From campaign meetings to social media”). To do so I primarily use data from three countries: the United States, France and Canada.

### Canada

In Canada, data on election spending are available on the “Elections Canada” website, for example see here for party accounts:

<http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=fin&document=index&dir=oth/pol/asset&lang=f>

See here for election spending by type of return:

<http://www.elections.ca/wpapps/WPF/FR/Home/Index?returntype=1>

and here for the amount of public reimbursements:

<http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=fin&dir=oth/pol/remb&document=index&lang=f>

These data enabled me, for example, to construct **Figure 61** (p.238) in the book, which details the share of political party election spending allocated to audiovisual advertising.

### United States

In the United States, as was the case for the total amounts, we find huge quantities of information on the nature of candidate spending on the [FEC](#) website, for example here:

[https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data\\_type=processed&two\\_year\\_transaction\\_period=2018&min\\_date=01%2F01%2F2017&max\\_date=03%2F06%2F2018](https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&two_year_transaction_period=2018&min_date=01%2F01%2F2017&max_date=03%2F06%2F2018)

The [Open Secret](#) website is also a highly useful source of data. The interested reader will find, for example, expenditures related to Hillary Clinton’s campaign in 2016:

<https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/expenditures?id=N00000019>

and those relating to Donald Trump's campaign:

<https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/expenditures?id=N00023864>

Unfortunately, [Open Secret](#) groups expenditures into a very limited number of categories; for example, it is not possible to distinguish as I do in the book between “Internet” spending on the one hand and more traditional spending on the other. Hence the need to gather and format the raw information available on these expenditures on the [FEC](#) website. For example, see here for the expenditures of the DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC. (COO580100) campaign committee:

[https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two\\_year\\_transaction\\_period=2016&data\\_type=processed&committee\\_id=C00580100&min\\_date=01%2F01%2F2015&max\\_date=12%2F31%2F2016](https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two_year_transaction_period=2016&data_type=processed&committee_id=C00580100&min_date=01%2F01%2F2015&max_date=12%2F31%2F2016)

and here are those of the HILLARY CLINTON FOR PRESIDENT (C00431569) and the HILLARY FOR AMERICA (C00575795) campaign committees:


[https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two\\_year\\_transaction\\_period=2016&data\\_type=processed&committee\\_id=C00431569&committee\\_id=C00575795&min\\_date=01%2F01%2F2015&max\\_date=12%2F31%2F2016](https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two_year_transaction_period=2016&data_type=processed&committee_id=C00431569&committee_id=C00575795&min_date=01%2F01%2F2015&max_date=12%2F31%2F2016)

Catalist, NGP VAN and i360

In the book (Chapter 8, p.241), I note that since 2006, the Democratic candidates or their electoral committees have spent almost 4.1 million euros to gain access to Catalist data. These data are available on the [FEC](#) website, for example here for the 2017-2018 electoral cycle:


[https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two\\_year\\_transaction\\_period=2018&data\\_type=processed&recipient\\_name=CATALIST&min\\_date=01%2F01%2F2017&max\\_date=03%2F09%2F2018](https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two_year_transaction_period=2018&data_type=processed&recipient_name=CATALIST&min_date=01%2F01%2F2017&max_date=03%2F09%2F2018)

**Figure 3** shows the annual evolution of campaign money received by Catalist between 2007 and March 2018 (note 31, p.241 of the book).




**Figure 3:** Total annual election expenditure in the United States (FEC data) whose main beneficiary was the Catalist company (expenses of the Democratic Party, Democratic candidates or their electoral commissions)

By carrying out similar research into Democratic spending received by the NGP VAN company, and for Republican spending received by the i360 company, we obtain Figure 4 and Figure 5 (p.241 of the book).



**Figure 4:** Total annual election expenditure in the United States (FEC data) whose main beneficiary was the NGP VAN company (and the NGP and Voter Activation Network before 2010 and the merging of the two companies) (expenses of the Democratic Party, Democratic candidates or their electoral commissions)



**Figure 5:** Total annual election expenditure in the United States (FEC data) received by the i360 company (expenses of the Republican Party, Republican candidates or their electoral commissions)

## France

For France, information on the nature of election expenditure by candidates (**Figures 63 to 65** of the book) can be found in the activity reports published each year by the [CNCCFP](#), as well as in the reports on electoral spending published by the Interior Ministry, and in the candidates' accounts published in the Official Journal.



## The private funding of democracy: private donations to political parties

I present here the main sources of data used to construct the figures given in the book on the private funding of political parties (for example, **Figure 32** and **Figure 33**, pp. 94-95). Unfortunately, the information available is far from homogeneous from one country to another, and so, while in some countries it is easy to distinguish between donations from individuals, donations from legal persons, contributions from elected officials and member subscriptions, in others this is not so, given that some of these categories are grouped into a single variable.

For this reason, in the book some information is not available for certain parties (for example, the amount of contributions made by elected officials for parties in Belgium). Donation amounts are mostly available in party accounts, and I inform the interested reader where those accounts can be found.

### Germany

In Germany, every year political parties disclose the total amount of private donations they have received in their accounts. The party accounts – which I have digitized and formatted – are available online as a pdf for the earliest years on the Bundestag website, and in Excel format for more recent years.

In the German party accounts, we find:

- The total donation amount and the division between donations by individuals and donations by legal persons.
- Member subscriptions.
- Contributions made by elected officials.

### Belgium

The accounts of Belgian political parties are available – albeit in a somewhat disorganized fashion! – on the website of the Belgian Parliament<sup>2</sup>. The interested reader will find links to

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/index.cfm?language=fr>

the annual accounts (in pdf) of the various parties on the website [Pol.Fin](#), developed by researchers at the KU Leuven University, in particular by Jef Smulders whom I should like to thank for his invaluable advice on the Belgian data. I have formatted the accounts in Excel and in such a way that enables a comparison from one year to another based on these paper archives.

## France

The data used for France are described a little later on in this Technical Annex, when I discuss the respective advantages of taxation data and party accounts data.

## Italy

In Italy, as for Germany and Belgium, the data on donation amounts received by the various parties come from the party accounts.

## United Kingdom

Various sources of data exist for party accounts in the UK.

For the years 2007-2015, these accounts are available on the Electoral Commission website:

<http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/Search/Accounts?currentPage=1&rows=10&sort=TotalIncome&order=desc&open=filter&et=pp&year=2014&register=gb&register=ni&register=none&regStatus=registered&rptBy=centralparty&rptBy=accountingunits&optCols=PublishedDate&optCols=FinancialYearEnd&optCols=BandName&optCols=SoaType>

These accounts are more difficult to come by for earlier years, and I would like to highlight the exceptional research work done by Edgard Dewitte who combed the libraries and eventually succeeded in reconstructing the complete series.

The **Labour Party** has published its accounts every year since it was founded (1900) on the occasion of its annual party conference. These accounts are available on paper in a very small number of libraries:

- At the London School of Economics, where I would like to thank Daniel Payne and Emma Pizarro for their invaluable help. Unfortunately, some years are missing for the period 1985-2007.

- At the People's History Museum (previously the National Museum of Labour History) in Manchester, where I would like to thank Darren Treadwell for his precious advice.

The **Conservative Party** is less transparent on financial matters, but it is nonetheless possible to gain access to its annual accounts for the years 1930-1950 and 1976-2007 in the Conservative Party Archives housed in the Weston Library at Oxford University, where I am very grateful to Jeremy McIlwaine for his help.

Unfortunately, for earlier years the party accounts data in the UK does not distinguish between donations from individuals and donations from legal persons. Even so, a certain amount of information is available from the 2000s onwards on the Electoral Commission website where donations above a certain sum are listed – at least for the largest donations – which gives an idea of the share that each of these two sources of donations represents.

For example, the data are available here:


<https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations>

and here:

<http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/Search/Spending?currentPage=0&rows=10&sort=DateIncurred&order=desc&tab=1&et=pp&et=ppm&et=tp&et=perpar&et=rd&evt=ukparliament&evt=nationalassemblyforwales&evt=scottishparliament&evt=northernirelandassembly&evt=europeanparliament&evt=referendum&optCols=CampaigningName&optCols=ExpenseCategoryName&optCols=FullAddress&optCols=AmountInEngland&optCols=AmountInScotland&optCols=AmountInWales&optCols=AmountInNorthernIreland&optCols=DateOfClaimForPayment&optCols=DatePaid>


### Additional figures

In **Germany**, it is mandatory for political parties to publish a list of donations above 10,000 euros at the end of every year (p.76). It is therefore possible to analyse the evolution of the share of donations above 10,000 euros out of the total donations (Figure 6).




**Figure 6** : Share of donations over 10,000 euros out of the total donations made to political parties, Germany, 1983-2015

For the United Kingdom, in the book (**Figure 27**, p.85) I have represented the distribution of donation amounts by decile of donations. The same can be done for individual donations and company donations separately. In particular, considering individual donations in isolation makes this figure more easily comparable than was the case for France. Figure 7 represents the average donation amount and the total donations by decile of donations for those made by individuals only.



**Figure 7:** Average donation and total donations made to political parties by decile of donations, Individual donations, United Kingdom, 2017

Finally, an **international comparison** is presented in Figure 8, which represents the total annual average donation amount (both by individuals and legal persons in the countries where these are allowed) received by the main left-wing and right-wing parties in the UK, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium (note 33, p.94).



**Figure 8:** Total annual amount of donations per adult received by the main right-wing and left-wing political parties (average 2012-2016), International comparison (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium)

## The private funding of democracy: tax expenditure associated with donations

### Germany

In Germany, private donations up to 1,650 euros per person are directly tax-deductible at 50%. Thus, a private donation of 1,650 euros costs the government 825 euros. Furthermore, donations of between 1,650 and 3,300 euros can also be deducted as exceptional expenses, which adds an additional expense for the state. Unfortunately, the German tax office does not publish (at least to my knowledge) annual information on the total tax expenditure associated with donations. According to my estimates, the annual tax expenditure between 2012 and 2016 was between 70 and 104 million euros.

### Canada

According to [OECD data](#) for Canada, tax spending is estimated at 25 millions Canadian dollars (CAD) in election years, i.e. around 16.5 million euros<sup>3</sup>.

### Italy

In Italy, tax deductions associated with donations to political parties were introduced in 1997. Between 1997 and 2013, tax expenditure associated with tax credit for private donations to parties and campaigns is estimated at 25.8 million euros per year. It totalled 8.7 million euros in 2014, 27.4 million euros in 2015, and 15.65 million euros in 2016. These data come from official documents published by Parliament, which passed a law setting a cap on tax expenditure for the government (article 9 of law 2/1997 for the 1997-2013 data; article 7 of law 96/2012 for the 2014 data; article 11 of the decree law 149/2013 for 2015 and 2016).

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<sup>3</sup> “Financing Democracy. Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns and the Risk of Policy Capture”, OECD Public Governance Reviews, 2016.

## Political party donations in France: taxation data or party accounts data?

As I reiterate in Chapter 4 of the book, there are two sources of data in France for anyone interested in donations to political parties: first, taxation data; and second, party accounts data.

With regard to **taxation data**, since 2013 the “sampled income tax files” allow access to information on the total amount of donations and contributions – if declared, that is – to political parties. I should like to thank the [Centre d’Accès Sécurisé aux Données](#) (CASD) for giving me access to these data. We should note here that they only include donations and contributions to parties and not donations to electoral campaigns, since – somewhat surprisingly – the tax rules are such in France that, while donations for the benefit of “a party or group policy” must be declared on line 7UH of the income tax return form (and therefore since 2013 can be analysed separately, whereas before they were simply grouped with other donations), donations to “one or more candidates” – i.e. to election campaigns – must be declared on line 7UF, that is, together with payments made to works of public utility and works of general interest that cannot be differentiated.<sup>4</sup>

**Party political accounts**, meanwhile, have been published in France since 1990 within the “General publication of party accounts and political groups” (“Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques” – which has been a mandatory requirement since that date). Party account files are available in Excel format on the [CNCCFP](#) website (as well as on the open platform of French public data<sup>5</sup>) since 2012. For the other years, I personally gathered, digitized and formatted in Excel the paper data containing party accounts. I should like to thank Thomas Ferguson at the [Institute for New Economic Thinking](#) (INET) for agreeing to fund this major task of data collection.

When analyzing donations to parties it is interesting to use both of these data sources because they each have certain advantages and disadvantages. What is more, as can be clearly seen in Figure 9 for the period 2013-2016 (the four years for which both data sources are available), the data presented in the two sources do not always coincide, and it is important to understand the reason for this (note 28, p.86). Particularly in view of the fact that, with the exception of


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<sup>4</sup> See for example the “Brochure pratique 2017” published by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance for the income tax declaration 2016:  
[https://www.impots.gouv.fr/portail/www2/fichiers/documentation/brochure/ir\\_2017/files/assets/common/downloads/publication.pdf](https://www.impots.gouv.fr/portail/www2/fichiers/documentation/brochure/ir_2017/files/assets/common/downloads/publication.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/comptes-des-partis-et-groupements-politiques/>



2016, the donations listed in the party accounts are systematically lower than those listed by the tax office.



**Figure 9:** Donations and contributions to political parties, tax data vs. party accounts, France, 2013-2016

### Over- or under-reporting?

How can the differences between taxation data and party accounts data be explained? On the one hand, they may reflect the existence of tax fraud. Indeed, it is not mandatory for taxpayers to include their donation receipts in their tax returns, which may lead to an over-declaration of donations in taxation data. Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2016) showed how a tightening up of the requirements to claim charitable deductions in France in 1983 – when taxpayers were required to attach donation receipts to their tax returns – caused a sharp decline in the reported level of donations<sup>6</sup>. It is surprising that this requirement is not in place today.

On the other hand, small non-taxable donors have no interest (in taxation terms) in declaring their donations, so we can imagine that they do not systematically declare the total amounts of

<sup>6</sup> Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2016): “The Effect of Tax Enforcement on Tax Elasticities: Evidence from Charitable Contributions in France”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 133, pp. 23-40.

their donations and contributions to political parties – which would, in return, therefore lead to under-reporting in the taxation data. Nevertheless, Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2010, 2016) have shown in their work (on French data) that even taxpayers who do not pay income tax – and therefore cannot benefit from the associated reduction in income tax – tend to declare their donations.<sup>7</sup>

### Donations in France by income bracket

In the book I have shown that most of the donations to political parties in France were made by the wealthiest members of society (the last decile of the population and within this last decile, mainly the richest 0.01%). Is this peculiar to political parties, or do we find the same distribution structure for all donations?


In French tax data (the FELIN files mentioned above), we can differentiate between (i) donations to aid organizations for people in difficulty (commonly known as “Coluche donations”<sup>8</sup>, box 7UD of the tax return); (ii) donations and contributions to political parties (which I deal with in my book in the calculation of the tax expenditure by level of income, box 7UH); and (iii) other donations (“donations to other organizations of general interest”, box 7UF). Donations to organizations assisting people in difficulty qualify for a tax break equal to 75% of the payments with a limit of 530 euros. Higher amounts are eligible for the same tax reduction of 66% up to 20% of taxable income as for 7UF and 7UH.

Over the past five years, on average less than 1% of tax households have donated or contributed each year to political parties in France (Figure 10). In 2016, only 0.79% of taxpayers reported doing so (note 2, p.61)! And they therefore benefited from the associated tax breaks.

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
<sup>7</sup> Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2010): “Are Tax Incentives For Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France”, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2(2), pp. 117-41. Fack, Gabrielle and Camille Landais (2016), *op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> “These are payments to associations located in France that ensure the free provision of meals or medical care or that promote the housing of people in difficulty, in France and abroad.” (Based on the 2017 “Brochure pratique” for the 2016 tax return).



**Figure 10** : Percentage of tax-paying households declaring a donation or contribution to political parties, France, 2013-2016


In the book, I note that the wealthiest members of society give more to political parties than the middle and working classes, and this is particularly true for the ultra-rich (p.69). For example, I highlight the fact that the wealthiest 10% of French people are responsible for more than 53% of donations and contributions to political parties, which is higher than their overall share of income (33%). Figure 11 shows that this is specific to donations to political parties. In particular, the 10% of taxpayers with the highest incomes represent only 35% of overall “Coluche” donations (to aid organizations for people in difficulty), in other words their share of overall income (note 12, pp. 69-70).



**Figure 11:** Percentage of total donations represented by each income bracket, France, 2013-2016

### The advantages of party accounts

In comparison with tax data, party accounts as a source of information on amounts of private donations show a certain number of advantages. First of all, whereas tax data only provide information on “donations and contributions to political parties” in aggregate, party accounts data allow us to distinguish between donations from individuals (and from legal persons up to 1995), member subscriptions and contributions from elected officials (these three expenditure sources are also eligible for tax breaks). Party accounts also allow us to gain access to information on many aspects of the financial situation of the parties in question. For example, it is possible to study the evolution of the level of party debt in France since 1990 (Figure 12), a level that has continued to rise in recent years (note 29, p.150).




**Figure 12** : Level of debt of main political parties, France, 1990-2016

# The private funding of democracy in Italy: number and amount of political donations by income bracket


Although I was not able to obtain access to taxation data for Italy as I was for France, the tax office nevertheless gave me access to files tabulating donations by income bracket. Unfortunately, these data only cover donations made by individuals, and at the time of completing this Technical Annex (August 2018) I was unable to gain access to similar data for donations by legal persons. I would particularly like to thank Benedetta Ruffini, who gave me invaluable help in accessing these data.

Italy has just over 40 million taxpaying citizens. While in France only a handful of donors make financial contributions to their parties, in Italy the number is even lower. Indeed, fewer than 15,000 taxpayers declare a donation each year; in 2016, only 9,106 taxpayers declared one, i.e. just 0.02% of taxpayers. The overall amount of donations from individuals lies at around 20 million euros (Figure 13). In 2016, the average donation amount stood at 2,187 euros.



**Figure 13:** Donations made by individuals to political parties: total amount of donations and number of taxpayers, Italy, 2013-2016

Nevertheless, as is the case in France, the low number of donors is specific to political party donations. If we take into account donations to foundations, almost 771,000 taxpayers declared a donation in 2016. I calculated the number of taxpayers and the average donation made to political parties in Italy by income category (unfortunately the data available did not allow me to construct income deciles as I did for France; however, I did the best I could to create relatively similar categories in terms of number of taxpayers). Whereas the value of the average donation never exceeds 1,000 euros for taxpayers whose annual income is below 35,000 euros, the average donation is twice as high for taxpayers earning between 35,000 and 100,000 euros a year, and for the year 2016 this went above 7,000 euros for incomes higher than 100,000 a year (Figure 14). What is more, it is striking to note that, as for France, this inequality in the private funding of democracy continued to increase between 2013 and 2016.



**Figure 14 :** Average amount of donations made by individuals to political parties, among donors, by annual income level, Italy, 2013-2016

## The public funding of democracy


### Germany

In Germany, data on the total amount of public funding received by the different parties comes from the Bundestag website, for example here:

[https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/praesidium/parteienfinanzierung/festsetz\\_staatl\\_mittel](https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/praesidium/parteienfinanzierung/festsetz_staatl_mittel)

In the book, **Figure 49** (p.155) shows the total amount of direct public funding received by all political parties in Germany every year from 2002-2007.

**Figure 15** below shows the evolution of the total amount received each year since 1984 by all political parties *represented in the Bundestag* (note 39, p.154).



**Figure 15** : Total public funding received by the German political parties represented in the Bundestag, Germany, 1984-2015

### Belgium

For Belgium, the amount of public subsidies received by the different political parties comes from the party accounts. See above for the sources of data used for the party accounts in Belgium.



Canada

Direct public subsidies to parties – called quarterly allowances – were created in Canada in 2004 and eliminated in 2015. The data are available on the “Elections Canada” website:

<http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&dir=pol/qua&document=index&lang=e>

In the book (Figure 45, p.147), I show the total amount of these subventions between 2004 and 2015. Figure 16 represents the evolution of these subsidies per adult (note 25, p.147).






Figure 16: Total amount of direct public funding per adult made to political parties, Canada, 2004-2015

Figure 48 in the book (p.151), which represents the total annual amount of public funding received by the main political parties in Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Belgium does not include the Canadian parties. This decision was made firstly for reasons of legibility and secondly because these amounts have been non-existent since 2016 (p.150). Figure 17 shows these amounts in millions of euros for the Bloc Québécois, the New Democratic Party, the Green Party of Canada and the Liberal Party of Canada, and Figure 18 shows these amounts rendered per adult (note 30, p.150).



**Figure 17:** Total amount of direct public funding per adult made to political parties, Canada, 2004-2015



**Figure 18 :** Average annual amount of public funding per adult received by the main political parties (annual average 2012-2016), Canada

## Spain

In Spain, data on public funding received by political parties are found in the party accounts. Party accounts are published annually in pdf format by the “Tribunal de Cuentas”. I generated the Excel series from these accounts. Also on the Spanish government website dedicated to transparency (“Portal de transparencia – Administración General del Estado”) there are data on the amount of reimbursed election expenses received by the different parties for each election. In Spain, unlike in France for the reimbursement of candidates’ election expenses, before the elections political parties are entitled to an amount totalling up to 30% of their expenses.

## United States

With regard to the public funding of democracy in the United States, in the book I focused primarily on federal funding. I made this choice because the public funding of democracy has become concentrated on the presidential election and has not extended to local elections in a systematic way. When there is public funding for local democracy, this is moreover solely a matter for States to decide (p.144). Today, no public funding of local democracy is in place in three-quarters of American states (p.145). Thus, the public funding of democracy in the United States essentially boils down to the Presidential Fund. The functioning of the **Presidential Fund** – as well as many figures – is presented on the [FEC](https://www.fec.gov) website, for example here:

<https://transition.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml>.


The fund amounts are available here:

[https://transition.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/presidential\\_fund.shtml](https://transition.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/presidential_fund.shtml)

These amounts may also be recalculated based on taxation data published by the Internal Revenue Service, particularly the *Public Use Tax Files* (PUF). These are the data I have used in the book to show that the richest citizens contributed more to the Presidential Fund than the poorest (**Figure 54**, p.175).

If we look at the aggregate data – the percentage of Americans ticking the box on their tax returns each year – we find that the series constructed from the [FEC](https://www.fec.gov) data and the series constructed from the IRS data have very slightly different levels (with the exception of the year 2006 for which they coincide perfectly) but that the trends are perfectly similar. The

difference in level is on average three percentage points (Figure 19). In the book, I constructed the complete data set from 1975 using mainly the IRS data, extended at the end of the period by [FEC](#) “brought back” to the same level so that there is no jump when the data source is changed.



**Figure 19:** Evolution of the percentage of American tax-paying households that contribute to the Presidential Fund, FEC data and IRS taxation data, United States, 1975-2016

France

In France, when considering the public funding of democracy, it is important to distinguish between direct subsidies paid each year to parties, and the reimbursement of campaign spending received by candidates.

Direct funding of parties

The amounts of direct public subsidies paid each year to the various political parties in France are available here on the [CNCCFP](#) website:

<http://www.cnccfp.fr/index.php?art=636>.

We also find these amounts in the political party accounts (see above for the sources of data used for the party accounts).


Reimbursement of campaign expenses

The data on the reimbursement of campaign expenses come from the [CNCCEP](#) activity reports and the Official Journal.

The varying importance of the public funding of democracy

In the book, I have shown the total amount of public subsidies received by the different parties in different countries in millions of euros and per adult (**Figure 48**, p.151). There are significant differences between the various countries.

Another way of seeing these differences consists in studying the share represented by direct public subsidies in overall party funding (note 35, p.153). This is shown in **Figure 20**.



**Figure 20:** Share of public subsidies in overall party funding (annual average 2012-216), International comparison

## 2 per 1000, 5 per 1000, 8 per 1000: Italian-style democracy through taxation

The final part of Chapter 2 of the book, “The hypocrisy of Italian-style democracy out of taxation” (pp. 52-59), gives a detailed picture of the 2 per 1000 system introduced in Italy in 2014. The interested reader will find more information on this system here:

<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/italy-legislation-on-public-financing-for-political-parties/>

and here:

<https://blog.openpolis.it/2016/07/22/public-funding-for-political-parties-in-italy-new-minidossier-by-openpolis/9860>

Figure 21 reproduces the income tax return form where the 2 per 1000 appears:

**SCelta PER LA DESTINAZIONE DEL DUE PER MILLE DELL'IRPEF** (in caso di scelta FIRMARE nello spazio sottostante)

PARTITO POLITICO

CODICE  FIRMA .....

**AVVERTENZE** Per esprimere la scelta a favore di uno dei partiti politici beneficiari del due per mille dell'IRPEF, il contribuente deve apporre la propria firma nel riquadro, indicando il codice del partito prescelto. La scelta deve essere fatta esclusivamente per uno solo dei partiti politici beneficiari.

*In aggiunta a quanto indicato nell'informativa sul trattamento dei dati, contenuta nelle istruzioni, si precisa che i dati personali del contribuente verranno utilizzati solo dall'Agenzia delle Entrate per attuare la scelta.*

Figure 21: Income tax declaration form: 2 per 1000, Italy

In this Technical Annex I will make a number of comments on the other two forms of “democracy out of taxation” in Italy: the 5 per mille and the 8 per mille.


### The 8 per 1000

In Italy, the 8 per 1000 was established in 1985 to fund the Church. Unlike the 2 per mille, the entire 8 per 1000 must be given to funding. In other words, even if a citizen decides not to use the opportunity, an amount equivalent to 8 per 1000 of her income tax will be distributed between the churches, on the basis of the choices made by the other citizens.

However, rather than ticking the box corresponding to one of the churches, a citizen can check the “Stato” box. In this case, according to Law no. 222/1985, the funds will be used by the State for extraordinary interventions in the following areas: world famine; natural disasters; assistance to refugees; preservation of cultural heritage. Since 2013 (Law no. 147/2013), the restructuring, securing and improving of the seismic adaptation and energy efficiency of public buildings used for educational purposes have also been added to this list.

### The 5 per 1000

The 5 per 1000 was established in 2005 (by Law no. 266/2005), firstly on an experimental basis before being permanently confirmed in Law no. 190/2014 on account of its success. Indeed, in 2008 (tax return for 2007), the total amount allocated to this system by Italians exceeded the cap set by the State – the maximum amount of funds that can be allocated is now 500 million euros a year – and there has been a rise in both the number of taxpayers who use the 5 per mille and the number of organizations that benefit from it. This number indeed rose from 29,165 in 2006 to 56,581 in 2017. The percentage of taxpayers who use the system rose from 41.6% to almost 48% (Figure 22) in just a few years.




**Figure 22** : Italy, 5 per 1000: percentage of taxpayers, amounts earmarked and amounts actually paid, 2006-2014



## Number of political party members

It is an understatement to say that political parties do not show a great deal of transparency when it comes to the number of members in their party. In France – but also in many other democracies – they systematically tend to inflate these figures, and there is a never-ending debate over the number of members who are up-to-date on their subscription vs those who are not, etc.

For reasons of consistency over time but also between parties, I made the decision to approximate here the number of members by the number of attendees at the various party conferences (Figure 23). Admittedly, such a method is far from perfect and leaves many unanswered questions, but it is difficult to do much better, and it would be preferable if in the future the parties’ transparency obligations included the requirement to publish annually reliable data on the number of members whose subscription is up-to-date.



**Figure 23:** Number of political party members (measured by the number of conference attendees, France, 2002-2018)

With regard to La République en Marche (LREM), in an article published by *Le Monde* in November 2017 ([http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/11/20/adherents-de-la-republique-en-marche-le-flou-des-chiffres\\_5217708\\_4355770.html](http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/11/20/adherents-de-la-republique-en-marche-le-flou-des-chiffres_5217708_4355770.html)), Arnaud Leroy, the party

spokesman, estimated the number of active supporters at 120,000. However, the movement claims it has 380,000 members.

## Confidence in the institutions

### United States


The data on confidence in the institutions in the United States from 1974 to 2016 (**Figure 53**, p.174) comes from Gallup (see here, for example:

<http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/212843/170626Confidence.pdf>).

### Confidence in the media

The collapse of public confidence in the institutions is of course not confined to the United States, although it is more pronounced there than in many other countries. This is particularly noticeable if we focus on the evolution of confidence in the media.


For **France**, the data on confidence in the media come from Kantar Public which produces data for the annual survey by *La Croix* newspaper. Figure 24 shows the evolution of this confidence since 1987. Several things are worth noting. First of all, since these data were produced, the level of confidence in the media can be considered relatively low, since it never exceeds 65% for radio and television, and 60% for the print media (newspapers). Moreover, if we exclude 2015 – that year the survey was carried out just after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, resulting in an “artificial” boost in the confidence expressed – we have seen confidence levels plummeting in recent years. The Internet does not improve matters; quite the contrary, since barely a quarter of respondents today trust this new form of media.



**Figure 24:** Confidence in the media – France, by media type

For the **United States**, the data on confidence in the media also come from Gallup.<sup>9</sup> They have the advantage of dating back to 1972. While 45% of French people today still have confidence in newspapers, scarcely 20% of Americans feel the same way (Figure 25). This may well have something to do with the election of Donald Trump.


<sup>9</sup> See here, for example:  
[http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/195575/Confidence\\_in\\_Mass\\_Media\\_160914%20.pdf](http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/195575/Confidence_in_Mass_Media_160914%20.pdf)



**Figure 25:** Confidence in the media – United States, by media type


### Confidence in the trade unions and other institutions

What is more, this general lack of confidence does not by any means affect only the media, Congress or the US Presidency. Figure 26 shows the evolution of confidence in the mass media and trade unions in the **United States** (as before, the data comes primarily from Gallup). With regard to the mass media, public confidence fell from just over 70% at the end of the 1970s to exactly one third today. Interestingly, we do, however, see a resurgence in confidence in the trade unions since 2007. This is in line with my proposal to give greater weight to social democracy and the trade unions through the Mixed Assembly.



**Figure 26:** Confidence in the institutions - United States, mass media and trade unions

In **France**, it is interesting to note that confidence in trade unions is greater than confidence in political parties (Figure 27).



**Figure 27:** Confidence in the trade unions and political parties (based on post-election surveys), France, 1962-2012

## The functioning of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (ESEC)

The Economic and Social Council, which became the [Economic, Social and Environmental Council](#) following the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008, was created in France in 1960 in the wake of many other consultative assemblies (such as the National Economic Council from 1925 to 1940 and the Economic Council from 1946 to 1959).

Today the ESEC has 233 members who are representatives of active civil society appointed according to their socio-professional grouping for a five-year term. They include:

- 10 representatives for public enterprises;
- 25 representatives for agriculture;
- 10 representatives for farmers and agricultural activities;
- 10 representatives for craft industry;
- 27 representatives for private industry, trade and services;
- 3 representatives for liberal professions;
- 10 representatives for family associations.

Members of the ESEC are appointed by the trade unions. Decree n° 2010-886 of 29 July 2010 on the conditions for the appointment of members of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council provides a list of organizations that may appoint a representative. Today, for example, for the economic matters and social dialogue these organizations are: the CFDT, the CFTC, the CGT, CGT-FO, the CFE-CGC, the FSU and the Union Syndicale Solidaires. The interested reader will find the complete list of these organizations by interest group here:

[http://www.lecese.fr/decouvrir-cese/organismes\\_representes](http://www.lecese.fr/decouvrir-cese/organismes_representes)



## Who are our elected representatives?

### United Kingdom

The data that enabled me to calculate the percentage of members of parliament who held a job as a manual worker or employee before entering the Houses of Parliament between 1951 and 2015 (**Figure 67**, p.309) come from the House of Commons Library.<sup>10</sup>

### France

It is more difficult in France than in the UK to determine the socio-professional background of our parliamentary deputies. Even so, on the National Assembly website, for a certain number of legislatures, we find a list of deputies divided into socio-professional categories: for example here for the 12<sup>th</sup> legislature (2002-2007): <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/tribun/csp1.asp>, and here for the 11<sup>th</sup> legislature (1997-2002):

<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/tribun/csp1.asp>,

but this information is not available for all the legislatures of the Fifth Republic and, furthermore, is not homogeneous in time or in its classifications.

Some information is also available on the National Assembly website, here:

[http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/tables\\_archives/index.asp](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/tables_archives/index.asp)

and here

<http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/deputes/liste/cat-sociopro>

Regarding the above link – current (15<sup>th</sup>) legislature – it is striking to note that the classification given is often incorrect. For example, Jean Lassalle is listed as an “agricultural worker” even though he has been working as a politician for many years.

For all these reasons, to construct **Figure 68** (p.310), “Percentage of deputies who were workers or private-sector employees before entering parliament, France, 1958-2012”, for that period I borrowed from the work of Luc Rouban on staff turnover in politics, particularly “Le renouvellement du personnel politique”, *Cahiers français*, 297 (March-April 2017), pp.32-38; and for 2017 I used the information available on the National Assembly website, after correcting a number of obvious misclassifications.

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<sup>10</sup> <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7529>

## Turnover rate among elected representatives

For the turnover rate among elected representatives (**Figure 69**, p.311), the historical data for **France** (1885-1936) come from the book *Elections législatives 26 avril & 3 mai 1936. Résultats Officiels* (Georges Lachapelle; Paris, Le Temps, 1936). This book contains a table detailing the number of seats to be filled and the number of newly elected representatives for each legislative election since 1885.

The data for the recent period (1958-2017) come firstly from *Le Monde* for the number of new representatives<sup>11</sup>, and secondly from Wikipedia for the number of seats to be filled.

For the **United States**, the data come from the report entitled *Vital Statistics on Congress*.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, for the **United Kingdom**, the data come from the same source as for the socio-professional background of members of parliament: the House of Commons Library.

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<sup>11</sup> [http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/19/apres-les-legislatives-2017-75-de-l-assemblee-nationale-est-renouvelee-un-record\\_5147128\\_4355770.html](http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/19/apres-les-legislatives-2017-75-de-l-assemblee-nationale-est-renouvelee-un-record_5147128_4355770.html)

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/#datatables>

## Non-exhaustive bibliography

When writing this book, I immersed myself in a great many other books, sometimes in search of data, sometimes seeking clarification in order to better understand the regulations in place in the various countries studied, but often simply fascinated by the research done on this vast question of democratic equality and the crisis of representation by my colleagues in political science, economics and sociology. Below I have listed some of the books that have particularly helped me, hoping that this may be useful for the reader who wants to gain further understanding of certain points. Many other references are also provided in the text and footnotes of the book. Most of the references listed here are not quoted directly in the book but have nevertheless played an important role in the writing process.

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## Recommended reading on the crisis of democracy, lack of representation and possible solutions

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